BEEFING UP SECURITY OFFSHORE

“America’s energy infrastructure is, as a whole, highly vulnerable to asymmetrical terrorist threats.” That’s the finding of a report submitted to the Office of Homeland Security last month by Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P., a Houston-based law firm that specializes in counter-terrorism, public and corporate security.

The sections of the report that deal with the maritime transportation and offshore exploration elements of the national energy infrastructure are particularly disturbing. Noting that terrorists “armed with little more than a skiff and simple explosives” blew a gaping hole in the armor of the USS Cole, the report says that, despite advances in safety, oil tankers are simply not designed to withstand even a rudimentary terrorist attack. A similar assault upon an oil tanker in a major U.S. port could have devastating consequences.

A large oil tanker carries at full load upwards of 38 million gallons of crude oil. If such a vessel were to suffer a major terrorist attack sufficient to compromise the integrity of the ship and cause the loss of the bulk of its cargo, the environmental impacts would be devastating. (By way of comparison, the Exxon-Valdez spill is estimated at 11 million gallons.) Even smaller "shuttle" type tankers can carry 500,000 or more gallons of oil. The complete loss of such a shuttle tanker in a major port under the worst-case circumstances would similarly wreak significant havoc. While tanker fleets servicing the United States have clearly implemented numerous controls pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, these controls were, for the most part, not implemented as a response to intentional acts of terror.
The volume of maritime oil transport is such that there are ample targets for a terrorist seeking to do harm. For example, according to National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), more than 750 fuel tankers pass under the Golden Gate Bridge each year en route to the seven major shipping ports, oil refineries and petroleum-blending facilities located in the San Francisco Bay area.

The risks here run far beyond the substantial environmental harms that such a terrorist attack could inflict, warns the report. An attack on a major tanker in port could close operations at the port for days or weeks. The closure, for example, of the Port of Los Angeles, through which the bulk of California’s crude oil passes, would create an immediate energy shortage of crisis proportions.

TARGETING OFFSHORE EXPLORATION ASSETS
What about offshore rigs? The Bracewell & Patterson report warns that “there is potential for serious harm if an attack was made against a domestic oil rig. Iraqi attacks against offshore Kuwaiti rigs produced an oil spill of between 24 and 60 million gallons, stretching roughly 125 kilometers long and 5 to 25 kilometers wide. (By way of comparison, the Exxon-Valdez spill totaled 11 million gallons.)”

Somewhat reassuringly, the report sees the danger of major damage from a terrorist attack to a U.S. oil exploration facility as “much less significant,” since U.S. facilities, produce substantially less oil than do their Kuwaiti counterparts. Nonetheless, “a well thought out attack against the right well could produce a significant environmental hazard. For example, an attack on a well or wells off the Louisiana Coast could produce a fairly significant spill that could do extensive harm to the area.”

What can companies do to protect their interests.

“Simply put,” says Bracewell & Patterson, “no private sector company has the wherewithal to defeat a terrorist threat on the order of a hijacked airplane turned missile or a weapon of mass destruction.

“Moreover, the types of governmental assistance required to combat such threats go far beyond the current levels of support now being provided.

“At base, it is inadequate to merely provide a few more guards or additional local police patrols around energy facilities. We need to think about Air National Guard combat air patrols; National Guard units specifically trained to respond to attacks on these facilities; secure intelligence sharing to prevent attacks; and, Coast Guard assets to secure offshore facilities, ports and territorial waters.”

CREATING THE RIGHT MINDSET, SIR
One of the most important steps the energy sector can take, says Bracewell & Patterson, is to create a security mindset that incorporates these issues into its decision-making as a whole–much as ithas incorporated environmental planning over the last two decades.

Businesses need to develop ways to bring these security concerns into their management and operations processes. They also need to develop strategies for dealing with the uncertainties of this new landscape. For example, the legal landscape that these companies now operate within will change in response to the terrorist threat. How companies manage and proactively drive this evolutionary process will be critical to both safety and success.

One potential vehicle for creating such a mindset is a Security Impact Review (SIR). For the last three decades, environmental impact statements have helped ensure that health and ecological considerations are factored into major actions at the state and federal levels, along with private actions that have a governmental “hook.” The Congress has followed this planning model in variety of other areas, including regulatory impact reviews and budget impact reviews. “A SIR system—stripped of the litigiousness and delays associated with environmental impact statements—could be created to help drive such an integration,” says the report. “Companies should adopt such a model internally and voluntarily to help them weigh the security ramifications of key decisions. Additionally, given Congress’ history of creating these planning vehicles, it would not seem unlikely that a SIR system will be proposed in the not too distant future in federal legislation.”

SECURITY IN THE OFFSHORE
SERVICES SECTOR
“You can walk onto just about any vessel at any dock at 2 a.m., go into the galley and make yourself a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, and not be seen.”

That stark indictment, made by Edison Chouest’s Chad Hebert, set the tone for a recent meeting of the Offshore Marine Services Association (OMSA), reports Marine Log Gulf Coast Editor M. M. Simmons. The meeting took a hard look at the offshore service industry’s current security measures.

Recalling the cartoon character Pogo’s assertion that “we have met the enemy and he is us,” OMSA Executive Director Bob Alario told participants, “Everybody is waiting for someone else to get the ball rolling.”

In the absence of self-policing, shipowners and offshore operators risk becoming unwitting accomplices in a terrorist act.

“We must enhance security—and in more than temporary ways,” Alario said. “With the loose port security that currently exists, any dedicated enemy can do what he wants.”

Alario added that while international companies typically are well versed in security measures, “the truth of the matter is, domestic operators don’t have a very well developed system for security.”

Hebert, OMSA’s Safety Committee chairman, said there are very few controls in place industry-wide that would deter terrorists from commandeering vessels for attacks on offshore operations.

Throughout a daylong session in New Orleans, OMSA members and officials from the U.S. Coast Guard compiled a laundry list of security measures—both high-tech and low-tech—that offshore operators can begin implementing immediately.

Here are a dozen tips offered by OMSA members: